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RETHINKING SUBSIDIARITY
IN THE EU: ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) is currently facing
major challenges, since the enlargement to East
Central European and some other countries neces-
sitates considerable changes in the structure of
decision making and the operation of the union.
The establishment of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) and the introduction of the euro as
the common currency in EMU countries testify to
a stride towards deeper political integration.These
developments suggest that a reconsideration of the
principles of public decision making is timely, and
they have led to the establishment of the European
Convention, which will submit its proposals to the
European Council sometime in 2003. The tasks of
the Convention concern the division of compe-
tence between member states and the Union, bet-
ter definitions of tasks for EU institutions, coher-
ence and efficiency of EU external action and
democratic legitimacy of the Union.1
The current times provide a good opportunity to
reconsider the public governance and organisation
of economic activities within the EU.The key ques-
tion is how decision-making for public sector activ-
ities should be distributed among different levels
of government. The EU is only one layer of gov-
ernment and there are other levels of decision-
making for public sector activities, including the
national and local governments in all EU member
countries. Some EU countries have an explicit fed-
eralist structure, so that their governments have
local, state and national levels of public decision
making. The non-federalist countries, for example
Finland and Sweden, have also some intermediate
levels of public administration, but these bodies do
not have any legislative power.
The principle of subsidiarity is one of the key con-
cepts in political decision-making in the EU. This
principle stipulates that public sector decisions and
problem solutions should be kept at the lowest
layer of government that is appropriate for that
specific task. However, the assessment of what is
appropriate must be specified by reference to fur-
ther principles developed in the theory of fiscal
federalism, such as international policy spillovers
and international public goods (see Oates, 1972
and Shah, 1994 for a general discussion of this
theme). Subsidiarity is a widely debated and even
disputed concept (see,for example,Bermann,1994;
Begg et al. 1993 and Alesina, Angeloni and
Schuknecht, 2002 and the references therein).2
Subsidiarity raises several questions.First,is it pos-
sible to provide more concrete and operational
content or guidelines to implementation of sub-
sidiarity for specific public sector activities?
Second, if this more precise content of subsidiarity
can be found, how well is the EU currently match-
ing these guidelines? Third, what might be the
directions for the EU to take in order to improve
its operation?
This chapter considers these questions from the
perspective provided by economic analysis. Since
the EU is to a large extent an economic union, an
analysis of the concept of subsidiarity from the
economic viewpoint can provide useful input to the
current discussion about the Constitution of the
EU and the future course of the development of
the EU. We will argue that here are useful eco-
nomic principles for assessing the application of
subsidiarity in specific governmental activities.3
2. Economic principles for subsidiarity
Consider a group of countries which have formed
an economic and political union in which there is a
union level of government besides the national
(and possibly lower level) governments in each
country. The formation of an economic union
implies the existence of important economic activ-
ities and policies that provide important benefits to
the members of the union. The single market is
probably the most fundamental economic factor in
an economic union (see, for example, Weingast,
1994; Tabellini, 2002). Economic theory suggests
that significant benefits can accrue from free trade




1 See http://european-convention.eu.int for further information.
2 Devolution of the tasks of the federal government is in some
respects an analogous debate in the United States (see, for exam-
ple, Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997 and the discussion by Musgrave,
1997; Donahue, 1997 and Qian and Weingast, 1997).
3The chapter focuses on different government tasks.We will not dis-
cuss the economic analysis of the formal structure of political. See,
for example, Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001) and Leech (2002) for the
latter.EEAG Report 77
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An economic union yields free
trade and mobility only within
its jurisdiction and not neces-
sarily globally, but regional free
trade areas are usually viewed
as beneficial.4 Since global free
trade and mobility are extreme-
ly hard to come by through
negotiations, regional integra-
tion may provide a way for
reaping some of the benefits
and it may also lead to further
global integration in the future.
A strong regional union can
also provide impetus to the
process toward global free
trade, though this need not
always be the case. Regional
unions are only second best
solutions, since they can lead to
trade diversion rather than the
creation of new trade. Trade
diversion is evident in agricul-
ture as a result of the EU Common Agricultural
Policy, as witnessed for example by the very high
food prices in the EU (Corsetti et al.2002,Table 7.1).
These considerations suggest that protection of the
single market with internal free trade and factor
mobility and the enhancement of global free trade
constitute the single most important economic func-
tion of an economic union. By itself, the single mar-
ket and common trade policy provide a reason for
the centralisation of specific economic interventions.
The protection of the single market can be in conflict
with the notion of subsidiarity that, in contrast, sug-
gests the greatest possible decentralisation of public
sector economic activities.Are there economic prin-
ciples that can provide justifications for the decen-
tralisation of public sector activities? 
From an economic point of view,the notion of sub-
sidiarity is largely the question of allocating public
sector tasks among the different levels of govern-
ment. Centralisation versus decentralisation of
public sector tasks raises many different issues and
the choice is not a routine matter.Centralisation of
decision making can, in principle, provide savings
of administrative costs, and problems of co-ordina-
tion of decisions and activities among the different
levels of government can also be minimised.
However, centralisation can also lead to rigid gov-
ernance that, in turn, implies inefficiency when
there is significant heterogeneity between coun-
tries in terms of the preferences of the citizens and
also in terms of the costs and productivity of pub-
lic activities. If centralised public sector decisions
are uniform across the different member countries,
as they tend to be in practice,they may bring about
considerable losses of efficiency because they arti-
ficially enforce homogeneity on heterogeneous
countries. Box 3.1 illustrates potential inefficien-
cies arising from rigid centralised decisions.5
It may also be true that bureaucracy increases in
line with more centralised public sector gover-
nance, leading, for example, to excessive delays in
decision making.The current EU is often criticised
in this respect. Centralisation of public sector deci-
sions can also lead to problems of accountability of
political decision-makers. A centralised govern-
ment structure means that the citizens are further
apart from the decision-makers than if public deci-
sions are carried out in a more decentralised struc-
ture. Accountability would seem to favour decen-
tralisation of public decision making.
The preceding considerations confirm that sub-
sidiarity, that is decentralisation of public sector
Box 3.1
Heterogeneity and inefficiency of uniform decisions
To illustrate the significance of heterogeneity consider a public good, say a
cultural activity, which has the characteristic that citizens of a country or re-
gion consume it jointly. In this case we can speak of total or marginal value
of the public activity. Consider the following example: Suppose that for the
citizens of country A any amount XA of a public activity has a marginal va-
lue 6-XA to them and that the marginal cost of production is 2. The efficient
level of provision XA to citizens of country A is XA=4. Suppose also that, if
the citizens of country B choose any amount XB of the same activity that has
a marginal value, say (1/2)(6-XB) to them. Note that, at each level of supply,
the citizens of country B value the public activity less than those of country
A. The marginal cost of production is assumed to be the same as in country
A. For country B the efficient amount of supply is XB=2, that is half of the
efficient amount for country A. Any uniform supply of the public good de-
cided by a union level government, for example the mid-point X=3, is inef-
ficient. This level is too low for the citizens of country A and too high for the
citizens of country B. In other words, a uniform centralised decision about
the level of public activity does not respect the preferences of the citizens in
the two member countries. It would be better to leave the decision about
this activity to each country, as the two countries would presumably choose
the efficient levels 4 and 2 of output.
4 Baldwin and Venables (1995) review the empirical evidence on
the benefits from regional integration agreements.
5 With heterogeneity, efficiency requires differentiation of benefits
and costs between citizens or regions and this is often difficult to
achieve in practice.decision making, should be favoured as a basic
principle. However, there are economic activities
in which centralised governance can bring forth
benefits in terms of improved efficiency and equity
among citizens. Tax systems are a case in point.
Decentralised taxation in a federation of countries
can lead to serious biases that, in turn, result in
inefficiencies and inequities. In general, economic
analysis suggests a number of reasons for centralis-
ing the governance of some public activities and
decentralising others. There is no simple or uni-
form answer to the question of centralisation ver-
sus decentralisation of public sector decisions.The
answer depends on the nature of the economic
activity under scrutiny. This chapter examines a
number of economic activities more closely and
discusses criteria for deciding when to apply the
principle of subsidiarity.
2.1 Public goods, externalities and spillovers
Public goods are commodities or activities in which
the benefits accrue jointly to the inhabitants of an
area or jurisdiction. Consumption or use of the
good by one economic agent (consumer or firm) in
the jurisdiction does not reduce the amount avail-
able to other economic agents in the area or juris-
diction.Public goods are goods that are jointly con-
sumed, and the consumption of the goods by indi-
viduals is non-rival.6 The costs of provision of such
goods are then to be shared among the inhabitants
of the area or jurisdiction. National defence, works
of art in public places and the preservation of the
cultural heritage are standard examples of such
public goods.
The benefits from a public good are geographical-
ly limited in most cases. However, if the public
good character of an activity extends beyond the
nation state, then it is efficient to make decisions
about its provision, including the sharing of costs,
at a higher level of government. The appropriate
level can even be the supra-national European (or
even global) level. If the beneficiaries of the public
good make the decisions about the level of provi-
sion and payment of the production costs of the
good,then efficiency can be achieved.Suppose that
the decisions about the provision of the public
good are made in a smaller area and thus by a
smaller group than the geographical distribution of
benefits would dictate.If this is the case,then some
benefits from the good and some potential contrib-
utors to its costs are not taken into consideration
and the outcome is usually inefficiently low provi-
sion. Generally, public goods are provided most
efficiently by a jurisdiction that has control over
the minimum geographic area that would inter-
nalise the benefits and costs of its provision,as sug-
gested by Oates (1972, p. 55).
There are probably not that many goods or activities
for which the public good character or non-exclud-
ability of that activity extends well beyond national
jurisdictions.7 Countries and political unions of coun-
tries are different as the former is likely to be the nat-
ural jurisdiction for more public goods than the latter.
We will come back to this case and the examples later
when we discuss the activities of the EU.
In addition to union level public goods, there are
other forms of economic activity where public
involvement in appropriate ways can be justified.
Generally speaking, this occurs when economic
activity by some economic agent generates signifi-
cant externalities or spillovers on other agents in
the sense that the latter get unpaid benefits or
incur unaccounted costs from this activity. If these
externalities or spillovers extend well beyond the
national jurisdictional borders, then involvement
of union level public administration can be justi-
fied from the efficiency viewpoint.
It is easy to think of examples of externalities and
spillovers. An important case is communication
networks.The benefits from membership in a net-
work to any single agent typically depend on the
size of the network. Any particular method of
communication is not useful to somebody if he
cannot contact many other relevant people
through it.Establishment of a common standard is
often important for networks. Competition
between, say different communication technolo-
gies, can be wasteful since the establishment of a
network often involves significant investments.
Competing standards can lead to wasteful invest-
ments; one of the duplicate investments in related
technologies is often redundant. Moreover,
economies of scale in production can possibly be




6 For private goods the consumed or used amount of the good by
any economic agent is not available to other agents.
7 For many public goods the minimum geographic area of benefits
and costs is smaller than a nation or state.In these cases,lower lev-
els of jurisdictions should provide the goods.EEAG Report 79
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Public decision making can play an important role
in the setting of a common standard and, for cases
of networks or standards that naturally extend
beyond national boundaries, the appropriate level
of governmental decisions will be the union level.
Economies of scale and benefits from common
standards may also exist in public sector activities.
If these are obtainable by joint decisions beyond
national jurisdictions, then union level decision
making is potentially justifiable on the basis of effi-
ciency considerations.
The general lesson from the preceding discussion is
that the appropriate level of government interven-
tion – global, union, national, regional or local –
depends on the nature of the economic activity.
This must be assessed case by case, and there are
few general rules about the most appropriate level
of governmental action. Moreover, in practice
compromises must be made since the geographical
dispersion of benefits for public goods and
spillovers need not follow the geographical bound-
aries of the EU.It might also be impractical to have
too many levels that are geared just to decisions
about specific public goods or spillovers. Ad-
ministrative efficiency must also be taken into con-
sideration.
It is important to point out that, even if a particu-
lar good is a public good, its provision need not
always be handled by a government agency. The
forms of government intervention, be it at union,
national or local level, can vary a great deal from
case to case. The forms of intervention can range
from common regulation to the provision of the
good or activity through public funds and agencies.
It must also be emphasised that governmental
decision-making covers much more than the provi-
sion of physical goods and services. For example,
ensuring a stable financial system for the operation
of a single market is an activity in which externali-
ties are not very tangible but nevertheless impor-
tant.As discussed in Chapter 4,financial regulation
is basically a union level activity for the EU.
Another example that respects subsidiarity is the
establishment of national fiscal councils which is
suggested in Chapter 2.The notion of a single mar-
ket for the EU has many dimensions and,as a com-
mon goal, implies different types of decisions and
activities.The question of subsidiarity can be raised
with respect to many different types of public
activity, including taxes and subsidies, redistribu-
tion and the welfare state, labour market stan-
dards, regulatory standards for industry and com-
petition, environmental standards and so on We
will analyse subsidiarity in relation to different
types of activity further in Section 4.
2.2 Politico-economic aspects
The above discussion about the allocation of tasks
to different levels of government has been con-
ducted from the basic viewpoint of economic effi-
ciency. Subsidiarity can, however, also be consid-
ered from a different economic viewpoint that
combines the functioning of the political and eco-
nomic systems. This is the so-called political econ-
omy approach.
Competition between jurisdictions 
One strand in the political economy approach
emphasises competition between national jurisdic-
tions. It is often argued that intergovernmental or
“systems” competition can involve a “race to the
bottom” where, in terms of economic efficiency,
too low levels of public goods or activities are pro-
vided.A well-known example is tax competition. It
is suggested that, in order to attract more capital
and investment, countries compete by lowering
their taxes on capital to zero, since capital is inter-
nationally mobile and would move to the country
with lowest taxation. Labour is also potentially
mobile and can possibly move in search of the
highest net social benefits.8
A counterpart to tax competition is subsidy com-
petition for particular industries. Shipbuilding pro-
vides a current example. Various governments in
the world subsidise shipyards, and even within the
EU it has been very difficult to abolish these sub-
sidies. This seems in part to be caused by subsidis-
ation of the activity in other countries outside the
EU. These subsidies run seriously counter to the
key principle for the EU, the protection of the sin-
gle market in which the competitive conditions for
different firms should be uniform.
The creation of unequal terms for competition
within the single market caused by public subsidies
by national governments is a risk that is potential-
ly present in various activities. One case is the pos-
sible reintroduction of the national subsidisation of
8 A recent OECD study (1998) discusses tax competition and ways
for managing its possible harms.agriculture that has been suggested in current dis-
cussions of agricultural reform in the EU. Natural
conditions for agriculture differ among countries,
but this is not a cause for concern.On the contrary,
this is an instance of comparative advantage, the
existence of which is the key basis for benefits
from free international trade.
More generally, national regulatory systems can
lead to “systems competition”, in which different
regulatory standards can result in important exter-
nalities between countries and/or industries.
However, in some cases systems competition can
lead to more efficient government decisions.
Solutions to these kinds of systems competition
need to be worked out case by case,as discussed by
Sinn (2003). It should also be noted that the argu-
ments about intergovernmental competition and
the “race to the bottom” or “race to the top” are
not easy to assess empirically. There is clear evi-
dence that, for example, corporate taxes have fall-
en and labour taxes have risen in many countries
during the 1990s after liberalisation of capital
movements (see Sorensen, 2000; Wildasin, 2000;
Sinn 2003 and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano,
2002). Nevertheless, the evidence on the mobility
of productive resources across countries and tax
competition is far from systematic,and it is not cur-
rently clear what the final verdict will be, as has
been recently argued for example by Oates (1999)
and Bhagwati (2002). It is probable that even with-
in the EU this mobility is less than perfect, and
thus the forces driving inter-governmental compe-
tition may not always be very strong.
The goals of government
A different view on intergovernmental competi-
tion arises from a fundamental tension in govern-
ment objectives (see Weingast, 1995). On the one
hand,a sufficiently strong government is needed to
enforce private contracts and to protect the eco-
nomic rights of private economic agents. These
government activities are important for a proper
functioning of markets. On the other hand, a gov-
ernment may not be benevolent but instead
“Leviathan”, aiming to confiscate the wealth of its
citizens. Strong governments may be successful in
this. Intergovernmental competition for mobile
economic resources can provide limits to
Leviathan governmental behaviour, though the
desirability of the outcome depends on the circum-
stances, as has been pointed out by Edwards and
Keen (1996). Improved accountability in a more
decentralised government structure can also pro-
vide limits to Leviathan behaviour.
A union of countries or a federalist structure with
decentralised governmental decision making can
be a vehicle for an efficient system of markets.
Three dimensions are pertinent here, according to
Weingast (1995) and others. First, decentralised
governments should have primary responsibility to
regulate the economy unless specific circumstances
call for more centralised decision-making. Second,
the union of countries has the task of running a
common market with no barriers to trade. The
good functioning of the single market is the key
governmental function at the union level. Third,
the low levels of government should face “hard
budget constraints” whereby they cannot have
access to unlimited credit or the printing of
money.9 These aspects suggest an important role
for subsidiarity as a general guideline, from which
departures should be considered only for specific
activities. Different ways of facilitating the single
market are then the main reason for exceptions to
the principle of subsidiarity.
For macroeconomic management these three crite-
ria are relatively well in line with the current divi-
sion of responsibility between the EU and nation-
al levels of decision-making. The monetary union
with centralised decision-making for monetary
policy can be seen as a method both,for promoting
the common market in the EU and for preventing
soft budget constraints for EMU member coun-
tries. The fiscal provisions in both the Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact are a fur-
ther means for preventing unlimited credit by
EMU member countries,even if concerns are occa-
sionally expressed about the restrictive nature of
the Pact from the point of view of macroeconomic
stabilisation policy (see Chapter 2).
The actual operation of the EU can vitiate the eco-
nomic principles of subsidiarity versus centralisa-
tion. Political bargaining and lobbying can lead to
inefficiencies in public decision-making. Decision-
making at the EU level is not free from these phe-
nomena. On the other hand, subsidiarity may be
exploited by national lobbies, and moving certain
decisions to the Union level can provide benefits
EEAG Report 80
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row for long-lasting capital projects but operate in private credit
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to member states. EMU and common monetary
policy illustrates this phenomenon; it enhanced the
credibility of monetary policy and has ensured low
interest rates for some countries (see, for example,
Corsetti et al. 2002,Figure 4.1).
Overall, the political economy aspects of govern-
mental decisions in a union of countries suggest
that the implications of intergovernmental or sys-
tems competition must also be assessed for specif-
ic functions and activities of the government.These
include tax competition, competition in regulatory
systems and issues concerning migration and
labour. A further controversial subject of sub-
sidiarity in decision-making concerns redistribu-
tion.We will take up these topics below.
3. What does the European Union currently do?
The previous section considered the basic econom-
ic principles of subsidiarity. It was suggested that
the important criterion is the existence of public
goods or externality effects with strong geographi-
cal dispersion of benefits or costs across a number
of EU countries. While we still need to consider
further the specific activities in the light of the gen-
eral principles, it is also important to take a look at
what the EU currently does. This will provide a
basis for a further discussion of how different types
of activities might be placed in the different levels
of government.
Here we consider empirically the current EU activi-
ties and policies.We look at them from two different
angles.First,we take up the traditional approach and
consider the structure of EU-level public spending.
We compare the structure to that of existing federal-
ist countries, such as the US, Canada, and Germany.
This comparison is useful even if the EU is not and
is not meant to be a federation,but rather a union of
independent countries.This is so because an efficient
distribution of tasks among different levels of gov-
ernment does not require the formation of a federa-
tion from a legal point of view. Second, we consider
the activities and policies of the EU from the point
of view of regulation of the economy that does not
often lead to significant public spending. This is
important since the budget of the EU is far more
limited than that of individual federalist or unitary
government countries. Focusing only on public
spending and revenues would give a misleading pic-
ture of EU activities and policies.
3.1 Public spending
The EU budget is shown in Table 3.1. It is evident
that EU budgetary spending focuses on very spe-
Table 3.1
EU expenditures by function
Function 1991 1994 1997 2000 2001 2002
Total expenditure in million EUR 55.4 70.0 82.4 89.4 92.6 95.7
EAGGF-Guarantee Section 58.7 53.5 50.1 46.4 47.3 46.5
Structural operations, structural and cohesion funds: financial mechanism, 
other agricultural and regional operations, transport and fisheries 25.8 30.8 32.3 35.8 34.3 33.8
Training, youth, culture, audio-visual media, information, social dimension 
and employment 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9
Energy, Euratom nuclear safeguards and environment 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Consumer protection, internal market, industry and trans-European 
networks 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2
Research and technological development 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.9
External action 4.0 4.8 5.8 6.1 6.7 7.7
Common foreign and security policy 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Guarantees and reserves 2.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4
Administrative expenditure of the 
Commission 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
Administrative expenditures (of all other institutions = Parliament, 
Council, Court of Justice, Court of Auditors, Economic and Social
Committee, Committe of the Regions, European Ombudsman, 
European Data Protection Supervisor) 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Eurostat, Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, Amtsblatt der Europäischen Ge-
meinschaften; Rechtsvorschriften, Haushaltspläne, Amt für Amtliche Veröffentlichungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften
1991–L30; 1994–L34, 1996–L22; 1997–L44; 1998–L44; 1999–L39; 2000–L40; 2001–L56; 2002–L2.cific tasks. Moreover, these tasks are quite surpris-
ing when they are compared to what economic
principles would suggest.Even today,nearly half of
the EU budget is devoted to agricultural subsidies
and guarantees, even though the share has
decreased during the 1990s. For 2002, the share is
46.5 percent, down from 58.5 percent in 1991.
Structural funds and operations are the second
largest item in the EU budget, with its share at
approximately 34 percent in 2002. These two main
items are largely redistributive in nature and, as
discussed below, it is far from obvious that they
should be the responsibility of the EU level of gov-
ernment.The remaining important items are exter-
nal action, that is policies towards non-EU coun-
tries (for example development aid and pre-acces-
sion strategy) and international
operations with a budget share
of 7.7 percent in 2002, research
and technological development
with a share of 3.9 percent and
administration with a budget
share of 5.4 percent in 2002.
EU spending on research and
technological development can
to an extent be viewed as a nat-
ural EU-level spending item.
However, this is so only as long
as the expenditure is an
attempt to correct for external-
ities in research, as will be dis-
cussed below.
The EU budget is quite small in comparison with
the government budgets of the member countries
as illustrated by the following comparisons. In the
period 1996–2000 the EU budget was only 2.4 per-
cent of the total of government budgets of the EU
member countries. In 2000, the EU budget was
only 1.1 percent of joint EU gross domestic prod-
uct whereas the share of national budgets of EU
member countries in GDP was 46.8 percent.
The structure of the EU budget can be contrasted
with the division of public expenditure between
national, state and local government budgets.
Figure 3.1 shows this division for some federal
states. Public expenditures are spread widely




Central, state and local government expenditures by function in % of total expenditure – 1996
Germany Spain Australia USA
central state local central state local central state local central state local
1. Total Expenditure 59.6 24.1 16.2 69.0 19.3 11.7 58.8 36.9 5.1* 52.6 25.9 21.5
2. General Public Services 38.1 33.5 28.4 46.8 14.8 38.5 48.7 42.3 9.1* 68.2 12.4 19.4
3. Defense 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
4. Public Order & Safety 7.6 71.7 20.7 60.6 12.8 26.5 15.1 81.6 3.4* 16.6 28.1 55.3
5. Education 4.2 68.4 27.4 30.8 63.0 6.2 29.4 70.5 0.1* 5.2 43.3 51.5
6. Health 72.4 12.5 15.1 36.7 60.4 2.9 53.3 46.0 0.7* 56.7 33.0 10.3
7. Social Security & Welfare 78.6 10.9 10.5 94.3 3.7 2.0 91.2 7.4 1.4* 70.5 21.2 8.3
8. Housing & Commun. Amen. 7.4 26.4 66.2 7.6 18.3 74.1 23.9 44.2 31.9* 70.3 9.4 20.3
9. Recr., Cultr., Relig. Affrs. 4.4 32.9 62.7 21.4 26.9 51.7 26.4 37.1 36.5* 17.3 11.4 71.3
10. Econ. Affairs & Services 
(11–15) 46.1 35.5 18.4 49.8 29.6 20.6 38.3 47.1 14.6* 42.9 36.2 20.9
11. Fuel & Energy 36.1 52.6 11.3 91.6 7.2 1.2 66.1 33.9 0.0 97.9 2.1 0.0
12.Agric., Forestry, Fishing, Hunt 15.1 75.1 9.8 31.8 60.2 8.0 49.9 49.5 0.6* 48.3 40.8 11.0
13.Mining, Manufac. & Construc. 93.9 6.1 0.0 47.4 46.1 6.6 43.5 40.4 16.0* 100.0 0.0 0.0
14. Transportation & Comm. 43.4 33.3 23.3 49.6 19.5 31.0 17.1 58.6 24.4* 27.8 44.7 27.5
15. Oth. Econ. Affairs & Serv. 50.0 30.8 19.2 60.5 24.4 15.2 66.4 27.0 6.6* 66.4 25.1 8.6
16. Other Expenditures 63.1 31.1 5.8 84.5 6.9 8.6 77.9 19.7 2.3 62.9 18.5 18.6
of which Interest Payments 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
*: From 1996 onward all government data are compiled on a year ending June 30.
Source: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2002, IMF; calculations by the Ifo Institute.
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services, education and health, social security and
welfare to a number of other sectoral activities.
There are notable differences in public expendi-
tures among the different levels of government in
the federalist countries, as shown in Table 3.2. For
example, public safety is a federal matter in Spain
whereas it is more the responsibility of the state or
local government in the other countries shown.
Another example is education, which is a state
responsibility in Germany and a shared task in
other countries. In general, for each function, the
division of responsibilities between the three levels
of government shows significant variability, such
that federal countries do not present a unified pic-
ture in this respect. A very important observation
is that the federal government accounts for a rela-
tively high share of total public spending. This
share ranges from about 52 to 69 percent in the
countries shown in Figure 3.1. This is in marked
contrast to the EU budget.
3.2 Regulatory activities and policies
The regulatory instruments of EU policies can be
divided into Treaties, Secondary Legislation and
Other Acts.Treaties are negotiated at Intergovern-
mental Conferences to be ratified by all member
countries. Treaties are the ultimate source of man-
date and legitimacy for all EU institutions and
their legislative and judicial authority.
Treaties are sometimes very general and at other
times specific, so that much of the governance by
the EU is based on secondary legislation and other
acts. Binding legal acts are divided into: (i)
Regulations that are directly applicable without
national implementation, (ii) Directives that are
binding but require national
implementation and (iii) Deci-
sions that bind all the parties
concerned. In addition, the EU
Commission issues a number of
softer non-binding documents.
White Papers,signalling legisla-
tive strategies, are an example
of such documents. Besides the
activity that is legislative in
nature, the European Court of
Justice has a key role as it both
interprets EU Law and seeks its application and
enforcement. Finally, international agreements
negotiated by the EU are a further form of EU
activity that affects its member states.10
The legislative activity of the EU has grown signif-
icantly over the years, as is indicated by Table 3.3
(see Alesina et al. 2002 and Pollack, 2000 for fur-
ther discussions). The table reports the number of
EU legal acts (Directives, Regulations and
Decisions), EU Court Decisions, international
agreements and non-binding documents for five
year periods.There has been a very rapid growth in
the regulatory activities of the EU, while the
expenditure share has risen only very slightly (see
Table 3.1). This indicates that a very significant
part of EU intervention has the form of regulation
rather than direct spending.
The data in Table 3.3 provide information only on
the total number of activities and policies of the
EU and is, of course, limited in three important
respects. First, pure numbers do not indicate the
importance of specific regulatory acts or public
expenditures. Second, the legal acts reported are
not good indicators of the acts that were actually
implemented. Many directives have not been
implemented in national laws and, what is worse,
some countries have an extremely poor record in
terms of enforcing the laws and directives. Third,
the data have not been classified according to the
functions that might or might not properly belong
to the domain of the EU as discussed above. This
limitation is difficult to overcome,but fortunately a
recent study by Alesina,Angeloni and Schuknecht
(2002) has considered the activities and policies of
the EU from the viewpoint of economic functions.
Table 3.3
EU activities; 1971 – 2000
1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000
Directives 108 264 330 537 566 532
Regulations 1,788 4,022 6,106 9,124 7,752 5,583
Decisions 716 2,122 2,591 3,251 4,242 5,299
Total “domestic”
legal acts 2,612 6,408 9,027 12,912 12,560 11,414
Court decisions 693 1,155 1,760 2,127 2,027 2,487
International
Agreements 454 488 517 542 852 1,223
Recommendations
and Opinions 68 114 95 143 1,246 1,505
White and Green 
Papers 0019 2 8 3 7
Source: Alesina, Angeloni, Schuknecht (2001).
10 Another important EU activity nowa-
days is the European Central Bank,which
is responsible for the EU activities in the
sphere of monetary policy. We will not
consider the ECB activities.We will next describe the regulatory activities of
the EU using this study.
Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2002) divide
the functions of the EU into policy domains as fol-
lows:
(1) International trade: the creation of the com-
mon market and external trade policy;
(2) Common Market: free mobility of goods, ser-
vices, capital and people;
(3) Money and finance;
(4) Education, research and culture;
(5) Environment;
(6) Sectoral business relationships: agriculture
(and fishing), industry (including energy) and
transport;
(7) Non-sectoral business relations: laws, market
competition and state subsidies;
(8) International relations: defence and foreign
policy;
(9) Citizen and social protection: home affairs, jus-
tice, consumer protection, civil rights, health,
labour relations and so on.11
This categorisation reflects only partially the basic
duties of the EU as outlined in Section 2 and below
in Sections 4–7. Categories (1) and (2) include pri-
mary functions of the EU and for most of them the
allocation of the tasks to the EU level of gover-
nance is largely evident.12 In category (3) monetary
policy has been delegated to the European Central
Bank, a EU level institution, but the “lender of last
resort” functions have been left to national author-
ities. In contrast, the appropriate level of public
decision-making on fiscal policy is far from obvi-
ous and is currently a hotly debated issue, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2 .In categories (4) and (5) there
are clearly variations, as some particular issues can
be naturally conceived to be governed at the EU
level, while others are mostly national or even
local. In category (6) agriculture is the oldest, most
active but very controversial area of EU policy. By
the criteria in this chapter it is not a clear EU level
task. In contrast, some other sector policies in (6)
may provide public goods or spillovers. Category
(7) contains both natural EU level activities (for
example competition policy), but state aids and
subsidies can also be counterproductive, possibly
undermining the single market programme.Finally,
category (9) contains both policy domains with




Breakdown of EU legislation by policy domain: number of regulations, directives and decisions
1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000
1 International trade 864 2,573 2,208 3,416 2,783 2,041
2 Common market 133 251 184 268 305 529
3 Money and finance 49 69 98 65 100 249
4 Education, research, culture 15 40 73 104 180 136
5 Environment 29 61 98 131 197 255
6 Business relation, sectoral 1,155 3,051 5,685 7,281 7,130 5,437
6a Agriculture and fishery 980 2,479 5,165 6,880 6,654 4,907
6b Industry and energy 109 445 408 300 309 370
6c Transport 66 127 112 101 167 160
7 Business non sectoral (compet./subs./company law) 116 137 256 358 669 1,406
8 Intl. relations & foreign aid (excl. intl. trade) 155 100 162 768 426 501
9 Citizens and social protection 96 126 263 521 770 860
Total 2,612 6,408 9,027 12,912 12,560 11,414
Shares (% of column)
1 International trade 33.1 40.2 24.5 26.5 22.2 17.9
2 Common market 5.1 3.9 2.0 2.1 2.4 4.6
3 Money and finance 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.8 2.2
4 Education, research, culture 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.2
5 Environment 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.6 2.2
6 Business relation, sectoral 44.2 47.6 63.0 56.4 56.8 47.6
6a Agriculture and fishery 37.5 38.7 57,2 53.3 53.0 43.0
6b Industry and energy 4.2 6.9 4.5 2.3 2.5 3.2
6c Transport 2.5 2.0 1.2 0.8 1.3 1.4
7 Business non sectoral (compet./subs./company law) 4.4 2.1 2.8 2.8 5.3 12.3
8 Intl. relations & foreign aid (excl. intl. trade) 5.9 1.6 1.8 5.9 3.4 4.4
9 Citizens and social protection 3.7 2.0 2.9 4.0 6.1 7.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Alesina, Angeloni, Schuknecht (2001).
11 The Social Cohesion chapter and attached social, structural and
regional funds are included here.
12 It should be noted though that (2) includes some regulatory
issues, whose conclusion is not obvious.EEAG Report 85
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justice) and others with far less clear EU level gov-
ernance requirements (such as social protection
and structural and regional funds).
Looking at Tables 3.4 and 3.5, it is evident that cat-
egory (6), Sectoral business relations, constitutes
the most active area of EU activities and policies.
Moreover, category 6 (agriculture and fishery) is
by far the largest subgroup within it. These activi-
ties are not obvious areas of EU intervention and
we will consider them further below. In the other
domains of EU policy, categories (1) and (2)
International trade and the Single Market are size-
able and quite naturally so since they concern the
key EU function, the creation and protection of
the single market.There is significant growth in the
share of some other categories, especially in (9)
Citizen and social protection and (7) Non-sectoral
business relations. Taken together, the total num-
ber of EU legislative and non-binding acts has
shown significant growth over the years.
3.3 An assessment
EU activities and policies are regularly assessed by
the citizens of its member countries in the opinion
survey conducted annually by the Eurobarometer .
Table 3.6 reports the average results for the EU as
a whole from the latest survey.13 Table 3.7 reports
the country-specific results as deviations from the
corresponding EU average in Table 3.6. The two
columns for the EU in both tables describe,respec-
tively, the percentages of people favouring either
decision making at national government level,
marked as ‘Nat’, or decision making as a shared
responsibility of the EU and national government,
marked as ‘EU’.
Table 3.6 shows that citizens of the EU member
countries would clearly like to give a shared role to
the EU with national governments in monetary
• and fiscal matters,
• environmental issues,
• international relations (including humanitarian
aid, poverty and exploitation of human beings),
• research,
• global crime protection and 
• regional aid.
According to the poll, EU activities should not be
focused very much on 
Table 3.5
Breakdown of EU non-binding acts by policy domain
White Papers Green Papers
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000
1 International trade 1
2 Common market 2 1 4 11
3 Money and finance 2 1
4 Education, research, culture 1 5
5 Environment 1 1 5
6 Business relation, sectoral 4 1 8
6a Agriculture and fishery 1
6b Industry and energy 1 4
6c Transport 3 4
7 Business non sectoral (compet./subs./company law) 1 2 7
8 Intl. relations & foreign aid (excl. intl. trade) 1 1
9 Citizens and social protection 3 12
Total 0 2 14 0 8 51
Shares (% of column)
1 International trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 2
2 Common market 100.0 7.1 50.0 21.6
3 Money and finance 0.0 14.3 0.0 2
4 Education, research, culture 0.0 7.1 0.0 9.8
5 Environment 0.0 7.1 12.5 9.8
6 Business relation, sectoral 0.0 28.6 12.5 15.7
6a Agriculture and fishery 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0
6b Industry and energy 0.0 7.1 0.0 7.8
6c Transport 0.0 21.4 0.0 7.8
7 Business non sectoral (compet./subs./company law) 0.0 7.1 25.0 13.7
8 Intl. relations & foreign aid (excl. intl. trade) 0.0 7.1 0.0 2
9 Citizens and social protection 0.0 21.4 0.0 23.5
Total 0 100 100 0 100 100
Source: Alesina, Angeloni, Schuknecht (2001).
13 See Alesina,Angeloni and Schuknecht (2002) for further discus-
sion using earlier data.• education,
• agriculture and fishery,
• health and social welfare and 
• unemployment.
The survey results in Table 3.7 for individual coun-
tries indicate some interesting country-specific opin-
ions.First,citizens’ opinions in some countries follow
the EU average rather closely. Taking (plus or
minus) 20 point deviation from the EU as a criteri-
on, it can be seen that opinions in Belgium,
Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands do not differ radically from the EU
average opinion. Second, citizens in the Scandi-
navian countries show a strong preference for
respecting subsidiarity, and this is so especially for
foreign policy, humanitarian and social issues,
refugee policy, justice and crime. Third, there are
some areas for which country opinions do not differ
radically from the EU average. These areas are
media,poverty,regional aid,education,research,for-
eign policy, police, drugs, exploitation and terrorism.
The empirical data yield a rather clear total pic-
ture. First, in terms of public spending, the EU is
quite far from the expenditure patterns of federal-
ist nations. The EU budget share in GDP is quite
small – indeed it is much smaller than the corre-
sponding share in federalist countries. Thus the
balance of government tasks in the EU is very
much geared towards national governments, which
accords well with the principle of subsidiarity. The
EU is not close to being a federation, even though
the non-budgetary interventions of the EU run to
some extent counter to this conclusion.Second,the
tasks that the EU level public administration is
currently undertaking do not accord that well with
the opinions of its citizens.Third, the current tasks
of the EU do not match very closely the economic
principles for decentralisation of public sector
responsibilities, which are considered further in
Sections 4–6 below.
4. Activities for an economic union: examples and
cases
We have seen that, for a number of activities, EU
level public intervention can be justifiable for effi-
ciency reasons. We will now discuss key activities
for which union level government intervention is
clear-cut in our opinion.However,we will also con-
sider some activities that are more controversial in
this respect.
4.1 Public goods
Section 2 argued that, for efficiency reasons, there
should be Union-level decision making for public
goods for which the geographical distribution of
benefits extends widely across different nations
within the union. The clearest example of public
goods with such benefits is probably national
defence and foreign policy associated with external
security. Strong defence by a country can bring
major benefits to friendly neighbouring countries
as it enhances their security, for example, against
threats against the territory of the former.
Significant cost savings exist moreover in compati-
ble weapons systems and common weapons devel-
opment,exchange of military and security informa-
tion and a common EU foreign policy diplomatic
corps for external security.
The existence of significant public goods aspects in
national defence and external security policy are
evidently areas where decision-making at the EU




Eurobarometer-Policies: National or EU level 







Humanitarian aid 24 72
Health and social welfare 59 37
Media 56 38
Poverty/social exclusion 30 67
Unemployment 44 53
Agriculture & Fishing 40 54





Foreign policy 22 71
Cultural policy 49 44
Immigration 48 49
Political asylum 45 51
Organised crime 25 72
Police 63 34
Justice 58 38
Accepting refugees 43 53
Juvenile crime 51 45
Urban crime 56 40
Drugs 26 71
Exploit. Hum. Beings 16 80
Terrorism 12 85
a) Differences between “NAT” and “EU” and 100 is the
percentage of don’t know. –
b) Information about the EU,
its policies, institutions and bodies.






















































































































)Efficient provision of these services can neverthe-
less take a variety of different forms and it need
not necessarily be fully centralised in an EU
agency even if overall responsibility should rest
with EU administrative structures. At the moment
the role of the EU is quite limited in national
defence and security, since NATO has in effect had
this role already for many years. Some EU coun-
tries are, however, not members of NATO, and this
situation makes the role of the EU fairly complex.
In the Eurobarometer opinion survey, defence was
not seen as a top priority for EU level action.
Evidently, there is major heterogeneity in prefer-
ences across citizens of different member countries
and the conclusion is less clear-cut than economic
considerations suggest (see, however, Persson,
Roland and Tabellini, 1998).
Other related goods and services, of which public
goods aspects can be geographically widely dis-
persed within the EU, are internal security and
border control, as discussed, for example, by
Tabellini (2002). With the Schengen agreement in
place, the benefits from joint decision-making
about the forms of border control are apparent.
Correspondingly, there are potentially large bene-
fits from creating joint mechanisms in internal
security such as Europol and close co-operation
between national police in the member countries.
The importance of joint action in internal security
has become apparent after recent terrorist attacks.
Apart from national defence and security policy, it
appears that there are relatively few public goods for
which the benefits accrue to the EU members joint-
ly. Other public goods, such as those associated with
culture, are often national or even more local in
character.14 Provision of cultural services raises diffi-
cult conceptual issues. Some forms of culture can be
provided through the market system, while other
forms seem to require some form of public interven-
tion.It appears that there is little need to have union
level decision-making or intervention for local or
national public goods and services.
4.2 Externalities and spillovers
Cross-border externalities and spillovers are the
other main category for possible governmental
decision making and intervention at the EU level.
This is the case when benefits and/or costs from
externalities and spillovers are widely dispersed
across the member states, so that a national juris-
diction (or contracting between a limited number
of countries) may not be able to internalise these
benefits and costs. Financial markets with inter-
bank cross-border exposures provide an example
of an externality which is potentially EU wide.This
case will be discussed in Chapter 4. Here we take
up other economic activities in which geographi-
cally widely dispersed spillovers or externalities
can also arise.
Networks
Trans-European networks, for example in trans-
port and in research, are good examples of opera-
tional structures that try to reap benefits from
spillovers arising as an integral part of the forma-
tion of a network. Compatibility of different
national parts of a network and free or low-cost
use of such networks leads to reductions in operat-
ing costs and can bring economic benefits from the
existence of a larger number of nodes in the net-
work. Free access to national networks of for
example roads and railways for users from differ-
ent countries is very important for reaping the full
potential benefits from these networks.
If investment into and provision of a national net-
work is limited to the country in which the network
lies, then risks of under-investment are a real con-
cern if important benefits from the network accrue
to users from other countries. Freeways and rail
transport network with intensive traffic across
national borders by compatible equipment (for
example trains) may need to be supported by inter-
governmental intervention, possibly at the EU
level.15
It is, however, important to distinguish clearly
between network activities that benefit all EU
countries and others that affect only two or a few
countries. Investments in telecommunications, for
example, belong to the former category, since each
country will contact every other country. Road and
railway networks, on the other hand, belong to the
second category. The border crossing connections
will typically help two countries only, and some-
times a third or a fourth country is affected, but
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14 However, a few cultural activities, such as preservation of key
monuments of human cultural heritage can be seen as even global
public goods.
15 See, for example, Shah (1994) for a discussion of the principles
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rarely if ever do they involve a higher number of
countries. Thus the EU should not subsidise such
connections.The EU could, however, have a useful
role in terms of coordinating and facilitating the
negotiations between the countries involved and to
design common standards for inter-community
networks.
Research is an activity that can involve significant
externalities. For example, a specific scientific dis-
covery can provide input to additional discoveries.
The additional discoveries may well take place in
different countries, which indicates that the exter-
nalities from research satisfy the requirement of
geographically wide dispersion of benefits. In any
case, the initial producer usually incurs all of the
costs of the discovery but may not be the recipient
of the benefits from the additional discoveries.
Moreover,cooperation of different researchers can
lead to increases in productivity, which suggests
that networking by researchers can facilitate
research. In these situations the research system
may not operate at an efficient level with too little
investment in research.
On the other hand, research often contains an ele-
ment of a race to be the first to find a result which
in itself implies overinvestment and unnecessary
parallel activities. Moreover, very successful
research is carried out by private universities in the
United States, which is obviously a decentralised
way of organising research.These elements dimin-
ish the rationale for EU support and centralised
action through grants as a natural vehicle for inter-
nalising the benefits and costs of research activity
and for achieving productive efficiency in research.
This impression is strengthened if account is taken
of the fact that, at the moment, the administration
of these tasks in the EU is very bureaucratic,
involving very long administrative lags and insuffi-
cient quality control, which can nullify the benefits
from the intervention. Moreover, it seems that cur-
rent EU rules for research grants imply a bias in
the distribution of the available funds in favour of
smaller countries, which for natural reasons have
more cross-border connections than larger ones.
This bias leads to a systematic redistribution at the
expense of large countries.
We conclude that trans-border networks and pub-
lic goods with geographically dispersed beneficia-
ries are important parts of EU level public infra-
structure whose governance can be facilitated if
the EU helps the countries involved to coordinate
their decisions. However, normally no financial
implications should be involved. In some other
activities, the spillover or public good aspects can
be much less dispersed. If so, centralising the pub-
lic intervention to the top level of government is
not the right answer from the viewpoint of eco-
nomic efficiency. We next take up a few other
examples of spillovers or externalities,in which the
EU-dimension in the governance of these activities
is even less clear cut.
Environment
Environmental concerns have an international
dimension in a number of economic activities.
Trans-border pollution provides examples of nega-
tive externalities that extend beyond national juris-
dictions. When such externalities exist, there is a
case for negotiation between the countries con-
cerned. It appears that relatively few environmen-
tal externalities specifically have an EU wide geo-
graphical dimension. In many cases the externality
is much more local and in some cases, such as glob-
al warming and climate control, the externality is
instead global.
The principle of subsidiarity suggests decentraliza-
tion of the regulation of environmental externali-
ties that are local, national or a concern to only a
few neighbouring countries, though there can be
benefits from having the EU set up a common
framework for such situations. The regulation
appropriate for global warming and any other
global externality is an EU level duty. The EU
alone is not the sufficiently high level of public
decision-making,but it is the natural party in inter-
national negotiations to control a global environ-
mental externality.
Ecological dumping as a result of too lax regula-
tion has been raised as a possible concern when
independent countries set their own environmental
standards. Opinions differ between academic
researchers about the consequences of regulatory
competition in environmental standards.These dif-
ferences are in part due to different circumstances
about possible environmental damage. If the latter
occurs only within the borders of countries and if
the profit from being able to freely use the envi-
ronment accrues to domestic residents only, then
national regulation will not lead to ecological
dumping (see Long and Siebert, 1991 and Oatesand Schwab, 1988). This reinforces the previous
observation that geographically limited pollution
problems do not require the centralisation of pub-
lic regulation.
In contrast, the outcome is not clear-cut when
there are international spillovers of environmental
damage and if foreigners are, to an important
degree, owners of polluting firms as is shown in
Sinn (2003). The outcome will then very much
depend on the type of regulations that are used by
the different countries. If international coopera-
tion is required, then a suitably designed system of
tradable pollution permits, which last only a limit-
ed time and are regularly sold by the governments,
can in principle lead to an outcome that internalis-
es the spillovers and externalities. The administra-
tion of such a system requires international coop-
eration, and the principle of subsidiarity does not
imply a decentralisation of this activity.
Natural resources
Management of commercial fishing, where EU
interventions have been attempted, provides a
complicated example, in which the fishing activity
by a single fishing unit can exert a negative exter-
nality on other fishing units.This is a result of miss-
ing property rights in the fish population itself.The
latter are an example of a common property
resource since in the water the fish migrate across
national borders. Such resources can be subject to
over-extraction.16 Any single fishing unit does not
take fully into account the effect of its fishing on
the fish population since the fishing unit does not
own the resource. Over-fishing results when all
fishing units behave in this way.This is a clear case
in which centralized action is necessary.
Fishing may be contrasted with agriculture, which
is a very different type of activity exploiting a nat-
ural resource, land. In contrast to fishing, it is easy
to define property rights to land and these rights
were indeed defined in Europe a very long time
ago. The justification for public regulation of fish-
ing does not apply to agriculture, which is a stan-
dard form of production and business activity.Thus
the common agricultural policy of the EU (CAP)
cannot be defended on the basis of a spillover or
externality.Traditional landscape and other similar
concerns can be seen as a public good, but if so,
certainly as one whose benefits accrue primarily to
local or national citizens.
Subsidies leading to increased production are not a
proper way to take account of such an “aesthetic”
public good produced at the national level. On the
contrary, such subsidies have led to an overly
extensive form of agriculture, which has created
substantial environmental damage (for example
pollution of ground water with nitrates) and has
often contributed to a destruction rather than
preservation of the landscape. Support should be
geared to the preservation of the landscape itself
or environmental improvement and not to agricul-
tural production. These arguments should be kept
in mind if the discussed reform of CAP is geared to
the introduction of national support to agriculture.
National subsidies should not be tied to production
or exports but rather to the preservation of the
rural way of life if a member country finds nation-
al support to be in its interest. Production or
export subsidies would also work against a unified
single market in which such subsidies would frus-
trate the forces of comparative advantage and
destroy the “level playing field” of the single mar-
ket. The 2002 Report of the European Economic
Advisory Group discusses further a blueprint for
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.
Quotas and markets for licences for the extraction
of a common property resource can provide an
efficient solution to the problem of over-extraction
of fish populations. The management of such
schemes requires public sector intervention, and
the market for fishing rights should be adminis-
tered by some public agency. The level of govern-
ment for the management of fishing rights seems to
depend on the geographical area where the fish
population resides and to which fishing fleets from
different countries have access. It is not obvious
that the EU administration is always the appropri-
ate level of public intervention in all cases. Some
fish populations are relatively local, though free
access of other EU member countries can make
management of a local fish population an EU level
concern. For some other fish populations a global
level would, in principle, be the right level of pub-
lic intervention. In the latter, the EU can be the
right type of public body for international negotia-
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To sum up, while there are environmental reasons
for common EU policies to regulate fishing, there is
no economic reason whatsoever for agricultural pol-
icy to be carried out by the EU.The subsidiarity prin-
ciple dictates that agricultural policy be shifted to
national authorities as quickly as possible.
Standardisation and product quality
Provision of a common standard for economic
activities can be viewed as a particular type of net-
working.There are clear benefits from well-chosen
standards, since wide usage in different countries
can provide benefits to individual users or lead to
lower costs of production and information to users.
In many activities there is a clear international
dimension to standardisation, so that its gover-
nance at the EU level can be warranted.
Harmonisation of product quality standards across
the member countries can be efficient, since it low-
ers the cost of gathering and understanding of
product information to consumers.Moreover,com-
petition in product quality regulation can lead to
too lax product standards, since individual coun-
tries can try to minimise production costs for
domestic firms. When all countries engage in this
race, a non-optimal outcome can result. Thus for
many goods and services, common standards and
the harmonisation of product quality information
across the EU appears to be an efficient level of
regulation.
For some commodities, in which for example the
use of hazardous substances is possible, product
information and safety is a major concern, while
for other goods this issue is of little importance. In
the former case, it can be necessary to establish
Europe-wide standards in which case an EU level
supervisory administrator is required. Food and
drugs are a case in point.17 In other cases, private
provision of the evaluation activity for standardis-
ation of products and assessment of product quali-
ty may be preferable to public provision. Michelin
guides for restaurants provide a simple example of
private supply of information on product quality
for those who prefer the French cuisine. The wide
range of cases in product standards indicates that
there is no single model of regulation or level of
regulatory administration that fits all the different
possibilities.
5. Tax and infrastructure competition
The international mobility of some productive fac-
tors, especially capital, has widely raised concerns
about tax competition and about under-provision
of public goods. It is argued that independent
countries have strong incentives to reduce tax rates
for mobile factors and that this would lead to too
low levels of some forms of taxation and too high
levels for others.18 An important related argument
is that, in order to attract businesses, independent
countries also compete for mobile factors of pro-
duction by providing excessive public infrastruc-
ture for businesses.
These two arguments, low tax rates for mobile cap-
ital and excessive public infrastructure to attract
businesses, raise a number of different issues and
require a closer analysis (see Sinn, 2002, ch. 2 for a
clear exposition).A key starting point is the nature
of public goods that the public sector needs to
finance. One possibility is that the public goods
solely benefit wage earners or consumers. In this
case tax competition prevails: a tax on the mobile
factor is entirely shifted to the immobile factors,
the income of the immobile factor is reduced, and
the tax revenue from such a tax is insufficient to
compensate for the losses of the immobile factor.
In contrast, the outcome is different when the pub-
lic good is an infrastructure good that benefits the
firms: tax rates will not be driven to zero and com-
petition in taxation and infrastructure can yield
productive efficiency in both, the international
allocation of capital and the provision of public
infrastructure. In this last case, concerns may still
remain about the financing of the public sector
budget,as the revenues from taxing the mobile fac-
tor need not be sufficient. A proper resolution to
the financing problem is to use a coordinated
requirement of full self-finance of infrastructure
goods from taxes on the mobile factor by all coun-
tries.The EU could,for example,extend its subsidy
ban to the case of implicit subsidisation through
under-priced infrastructure provision. This would
resolve the issue of financing difficulties without
17 These considerations imply that the EU needs to be concerned
with agricultural production, but the EU agricultural responsibili-
ties would then be focused on food safety (see the 2002 EEAG
Report for further discussion).
18 As noted above, there is empirical evidence about tax competi-
tion even if the evidence is limited and may not support extreme
“race to the bottom” arguments.necessitating a co-ordination of infrastructure. A
difficulty with this solution is that it needs even
more extensive monitoring than the present inter-
pretation of the subsidy prohibition.
It should be stressed that tax harmonisation is not
a proper remedy for the financing problem,since it
intensifies jurisdictional competition by providing
strong incentives for excessive investment in public
infrastructure. When the tax rates on mobile capi-
tal are fixed at the EU level, each single country
has an incentive to compete for mobile capital by
providing the needed infrastructure, but the
amount of infrastructure investment resulting from
this competition will be larger than what is effi-
cient from an international perspective. The har-
monisation of capital income taxes would require
infrastructure harmonisation to prevent this over-
investment effect,but in view of the prevailing eco-
nomic and geographical divergences among the
EU countries, the latter cannot meaningfully be
achieved. Alternatively, all taxes would have to be
harmonised such that there are no sources of funds
for excessive infrastructure investment. All this is
hard to imagine for the time being.
Are there any good methods for resolving the
financing problem with little international co-ordi-
nation? One possible remedy is the residence princi-
ple of taxation whereby taxes are levied at the recip-
ient of the income rather than at the source of
income. With resident taxation it is not possible to
evade taxes by simply transferring the capital to
another location. It may, however, be difficult to
administer residence taxation, since it requires
reporting of income earned abroad. Moreover, tax
competition can also ensue through investors shift-
ing residence rather than the location of mobile cap-
ital.Another possibility is to design the corporate tax
system with zero marginal taxes on new investment
but with positive average taxation. Such a system
attempts to tax only dividends but not retained earn-
ings, so that investment financed at the margin from
retained earnings are tax-free. However, such tax
forms entail the difficulty that new investment need
not always be tax-free.While retained earnings pro-
vide marginal finance for new investment for mature
firms, start-ups usually require new equity and divi-
dend taxes raise their cost of capital.
In general, the principle of subsidiarity in the
design of the tax system is facing serious difficul-
ties due to the increased mobility of productive
factors. Different degrees of mobility lead to both,
low taxation and less redistribution among produc-
tive factors. With a deepening of integration it is
possible that, in addition to capital, labour will also
become much more mobile in the long run. If this
happens, decentralised taxation by member coun-
tries will face increasing difficulties from tax com-
petition and wide-spread erosion of tax bases. A
well-functioning central government is an answer
to ruinous competition when all key factors of pro-
duction are fairly mobile.
6. Labour markets, social standards and the 
welfare state
With the enlargement of the EU, questions about
social standards in employment and labour mar-
kets and the future of the welfare state, that is re-
distributive capability of the state have become
subject to active discussion. The coming enlarge-
ment is different from the earlier ones in a number
of respects. First, migration to the existing EU
countries has been severely constrained, first by
the Iron Curtain and then by western immigration
laws,such that the migration pressure will not have
been relieved at the time of enlargement. Second,
accession countries have, with some exceptions,
quite low GDP per capita and low wages relative
to the EU average. Currently, monetary wage costs
per hour are one fifth to one tenth of those in the
richer EU countries. Moreover, social standards in
employment and redistribution and welfare bene-
fits offered by these countries are much lower than
in the current EU member countries.
These differences imply that there are tensions
concerning the welfare state, social standards and
the migration of productive factors. The differ-
ences in wages and social standards can be the
source of potentially large migration flows of pro-
ductive factors. It is likely that some capital will
migrate from the current EU member countries to
the accession countries, while the reverse is true
for labour. It is difficult to forecast the magnitude
of possible migration flows.19 However, it is impor-
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percent of the population of the accession countries will migrate to
Germany over a period of 15 years if wages converge at an annual
rate of 2 percent (Barro-Sala-i-Martin rule).This will imply an emi-
gration of 6 percent to the total of the old EU countries if the cur-
rent proportions of migration from the eastern countries to
Germany and the rest of the EU (two thirds Germany, one thirds
rest) remain stable. See Sinn et al. (2001).EEAG Report 93
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tant to understand the nature of the tensions and
discuss the appropriate policy responses.
6.1 The welfare state
From a personal ex ante viewpoint, income redis-
tribution and the welfare state are to be seen as
insurance systems.They protect those citizens who
will experience unfavourable personal circum-
stances, such as long-term illness or unemploy-
ment. The welfare state is a response to these
insurance needs20, and if there is no factor mobili-
ty we can think of citizens as contributors to the
insurance system and beneficiaries when they
encounter hardships.
This kind of closed system no longer works well
when there is factor mobility. Mobility can provide
a way to enjoy the benefits of the welfare state,
while at least partly avoiding the insurance pay-
ments. When borders are open and people are
mobile, differences in welfare systems can induce
migration. People in need of benefits move to the
country with relatively high benefit levels, while
“healthy and lucky” people (who are net payers to
the system) move out of the high benefit and high
cost country.With such movements, the funding of
an advanced welfare state runs into trouble and
there are pressures to reduce both taxes and bene-
fits of the system.
The magnitude of these pressures depends on the
degree of factor mobility and is difficult to fore-
cast. There is probably little mobility among the
current EU citizens. However, the differential
mobility to various western EU countries of people
deciding to emigrate from eastern Europe because
of the huge current income differentials could be
extremely high, implying a high sensitivity of
migration to even small differences in living stan-
dards among the target countries. One policy
response to the pressures resulting from the mobil-
ity of people would be to change the current prin-
ciples of eligibility for welfare benefits. Currently,
EU welfare states practice a dichotomous
approach to migrants within the EU. People who
come to live in another country for reasons other
than working there, are usually excluded from wel-
fare benefits of any kind and have to rely on the
benefits received from the home country. On the
other hand, people who come with the intention to
work, are fully included.21 Thus, a home-country
principle applies to non-working migrants and a
residence principle applies to working migrants
under current EU law.
If the migration-induced pressures on the welfare
state stem exclusively from the application of the
residence principle, a potential solution could be a
strengthening of the home-country principle by
applying this principle to at least some of the ben-
efits received by working migrants. Such a reform
would reduce artificial migration incentives due to
differences in welfare systems, though there would
still be migration for normal economic reasons.
Of course, as with all measures discussed in this
chapter, such a move would require a substantial
reform of the existing EU laws, which might meet
with resistance on equity grounds. However, it
seems to us that the alternative, which currently is
being envisaged by the EU Commission, that
immigration will be held in check by quotas and
other quantity constraints for many years to come,
would be a much more severe infringement on the
right of free migration granted in the Treaty of
Rome.The Treaty of Rome is not, however, in con-
flict with a solution which permits every EU citizen
who wants to migrate to migrate, but without
receiving any gifts.
In practice, the home-country principle is difficult
to be fully implemented.The provision of free pub-
lic goods with benefits geographically accruing to
only that country,is naturally funded by taxes from
factors actively working in that country. However,
it might be possible to try to apply the home-coun-
try principle in a limited way, whereby migrants
would be immediately entitled to contribution-
financed benefits, but only gradually entitled to
social benefits that are funded from general tax
revenues.22
The idea of gradual access to social benefits is
designed to minimise the fiscal implications that
arise from free mobility and differences in the wel-
fare systems between countries. These implications
are difficult to assess, as illustrated, for example, by
the case of differences in the skill levels of immi-
20 In practice also further re-distributive goals as a result of partic-
ular ethical viewpoints are stressed in political debates.
21 Sometimes the criterion for inclusion is actual work rather than
intention to work. There may also be special provisions for
refugees.
22 Such a system has recently been recommended by the Scientific
Council of the German Ministry of Finance (2001).grants. Highly skilled workers who have obtained
their education in their home country can be a net
benefit to the country of immigration. Correspond-
ingly, they represent a cost to their home country.
Such a brain drain is sometimes seen as an important
policy concern (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of the
question of a brain drain from Europe to the US).
6.2 Social standards
A related concern about the coming EU enlarge-
ment involves social standards of work, including
fringe benefits, work safety, pension schemes and
welfare benefits. It is often argued that poorer
countries practice “social dumping” by having
lower social standards and thereby gain an unfair
competitive advantage by avoiding the costs of
higher standards. Harmonisation of these stan-
dards is proposed in order to eliminate the seem-
ingly unfair cost advantages of low standards.
Such arguments are problematic as they originate
from a static view of the world.They ignore the fact
that different countries are in very different stages
of economic development and that wages are also
very different. It is well known that non-wage ben-
efits and work standards are positively related to
wages.Thus it seems likely that as poorer countries
become more advanced and catch up with richer
countries,internal competitive and social pressures
in these countries will lead to both higher wages
and higher non-wage labour costs.
It is natural to ask whether harmonisation of labour
standards would facilitate the process of economic
development and catching-up or whether it might
even have harmful effects on the development
process. An answer to this question requires an
analysis of the dynamic forces of development that
occur when a relatively poor country joins an area of
well-developed countries.23
A typical model of the development process pre-
dicts that in the short run there will be migration of
part of the work force of the poor country to the
richer area. This will reduce labour supply, raise
wages, destroy less productive jobs and induce the
(supposedly benevolent) government of the poor
country to raise work standards in line with wages.
The poor country will also enjoy a gradual inflow
of capital from the rich area. This will increase
demand for labour leading to a further increase in
wages and social standards. In due course, some of
the guest workers from the poor country will grad-
ually return to their home country. Eventually, the
poor country will catch up with the rich area.When
this happens there will be factor price equalisation
with wages and social standards reaching the level
of the rich area.
The preceding reasoning suggests that it would be
a mistake to impose the social standards of the rich
area on the poor accession country. The forces of
development should be left to run their course. A
policy of an early and quick equalisation of wages
and social standards between rich and poor areas
would have disastrous consequences. A large frac-
tion of the jobs in the poor country would become
unprofitable following the imposition of high
wages and social standards, leading to mass unem-
ployment and emigration out of the poor area. It is
also likely that political pressures would emerge
for massive transfers from the rich area to the poor
country. Most likely, a policy of harmonisation
would greatly slow down or even prevent the
development process whereby the poor country
gradually reaches higher standards of living.These
events are well illustrated by the experiences of
German unification, discussed in Box 3.2.
Differences in preferences of social standards and
wages among different countries do not change the
preceding conclusions. If one country prefers higher
social standards, then wages should be correspond-
ingly lower, other things being equal. With hetero-
geneity in preferences, the principle of subsidiarity
should be applied, that is each country should be
allowed to choose its preferred combination of
wages and social standards (see Jackman, 2001).
These considerations suggest that harmonisation of
social standards is an incorrect policy in EU enlarge-
ment. Instead, it is important to focus on ways to
facilitate the process of development that enables
the poor countries to catch up with the rich area.
Free trade and the provision of new markets to the
poor countries is the most important policy in sup-
port of this process. With new markets, the poor
accession countries will have increased economic
opportunities that will enable them to speed up eco-
nomic growth and gradually raise the living stan-
dards of their citizens. The process of economic
growth is necessarily slow by its very nature,but cen-
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tralised interventions in the form of prematurely
harmonised social standards, say by the current EU,
can only risk a slowing down of this process.There is
no miracle cure for an instantaneous closing of dif-
ferences in productivity, wages and living standards
that have built up in the past over many years.
6.3 Redistribution between people and between states
The governance of interpersonal income redistrib-
ution in the enlarged EU is a delicate matter. The
conventional public finance view is that redistribu-
tion should primarily be the concern of the highest
Box 3.2
German Unification and Social Dumping
From an economic perspective, German unification has
failed. There was an initial catching-up until 1996,
which was largely induced by massive tax incentives
and investment subsidies that made the cost of capital
negative for most investment projects and induced ex-
cessively capital intensive investment. However, the
east German economy has stagnated and the gap be-
tween east and west Germany has widened. GDP per
person of working age in the east has been falling rela-
tive to the corresponding value in the west for the last
six years, and currently stands at 58 percent. However,
due to massive public transfers, nominal incomes per
capita are at a level of more than 80 percent of that of
the west and pensions are at 110 percent of those in the
west. In real terms, about 10 percentage points can be
added to these numbers since the prices of non-traded
goods, in particular the government-controlled rents,
are substantially lower than in the west. 
The east German economy absorbs much more resour-
ces than it produces, the current account deficit being
about 45 percent of GDP. This is huge. Even the current
account deficit of the Italian Mezzogiorno is only 13
percent of GDP. Two thirds of the east German current
account deficit – which amounts to nearly 5 percent of
west Germany’s GDP – is financed by public transfers
via the federal budget, via revenue-sharing agreements
among the Laender (Finanzausgleich) and, primarily,
via unemployment and pension benefits. One third is fi-
nanced by private capital flows, of which, however, a
substantial fraction feeds an increasing stock of east
German public debt which has reached a higher per ca-
pita value than that in the west. 
Unemployment in east Germany currently hovers
around 17 percent, and there are regions where it is way
above 20 percent, even though many unemployed have
been hidden in early retirement schemes and training
programs. Regular employment has been shrinking at
an annual rate of nearly 2 percent since the middle of
the 1990s, long after three quarters of east German in-
dustry had closed down. While the industrial sector is
growing at a solid rate, albeit from a very low base, the
overall prospects for the east German economy are far
from satisfactory. The aggregate net public resource
transfer from west to east has been about E800 billion,
which is ten times more than the amount even the most
pessimistic politicians had dared to forecast at the time
of unification.
One reason for the economic disaster in east Germany
is an excessive fear of social dumping which led to rapid
wage convergence and an immediate jump in social
standards. The cost of labour increased much faster than
aggregate productivity, resulting in mass unemploy-
ment. High wages combined with tax incentives induce
overly capital intensive investment, and they also made
east Germany an unattractive location for international
investment.
Before unification, eastern wage costs stood at about
7 percent of those in the west at the then prevailing ex-
change rate (4.3:1). With the 1:1 currency conversion in
the summer of 1990, wage costs jumped to about
30 percent. Wage negotiations that followed in late 1990
and early 1991 specified a wage adjustment path reach-
ing the west German standardwage level in only five
years. Actual wages initially followed this path, but
eventually increased more slowly, since the privatised
and newly founded firms decided to leave the em-
ployers’ associations or not to participate in these asso-
ciations in the first place. Currently, about 85 percent of
east German firms with a majority of all employees are
not covered by union contracts. 
The wage negotiations that followed unification had
been proxy negotiations. They were carried out by the
newly founded east German trade unions, which were
completely under western control, and the employers’
associations which had come from the west. Prior to pri-
vatisation there had been no private employers in the
east who could have participated. Both bargaining par-
ties agreed that rapid wage adjustment was needed to
safeguard west German jobs and prevent foreign com-
petitors from buying up east German firms and thus ent-
ering the German market. In doing so, they were sup-
ported by a firework of superficial arguments provided
by politicians who forecast “flourishing landscapes” in
“three to five years” and warned of massive migration
flows which otherwise would have had to be expected. 
The results of the proxy wage negotiations were flanked
by the social union which implied high replacement in-
comes and forced market wages upward. The social uni-
on was introduced in the Summer of 1990 in addition to
the monetary union. East Germans were included in the
western pension system, received western type unem-
ployment benefits and were entitled to nearly the west-
ern level of social aid. Social aid was initially higher than
eastern wages and has remained high. A family of four is
entitled to social aid and housing grants amounting to
75 percent of the average east German wage. Social aid
and similar benefits implied excessively high wage costs
and a replacement income with which the market eco-
nomy was unable to compete. level of government.24 However, such a view
implicitly assumes a certain degree of regional
homogeneity, as otherwise the interpersonal redis-
tribution becomes an interregional redistribution
or one between countries.This is certainly a matter
of concern for the EU, where the income dispari-
ties between rich and poor regions will differ by a
factor of four or more after enlargement.Any uni-
versal redistribution scheme, say one that is based
on a common progressive income tax schedule,
would systematically distribute income from the
richer to the poorer countries. For example, even
an uneducated Swedish worker is rich relative to a
Spanish government clerk. There would be redis-
tribution of funds from Sweden to Spain. Such
redistribution might also be legitimated from a
deeper understanding of European solidarity, but
it clearly goes beyond the insurance motive that
can explain and justify interpersonal redistribution
within a country.
Above, we warned against ignorance of the differ-
ences in the stages of economic development and
against premature harmonisation of social stan-
dards that can bring serious harm to the process of
development and catching-up of the poorer coun-
tries.These considerations also suggest that income
redistribution through the tax and transfer systems
should mostly be left to the national decision-mak-
ing of EU member countries. Intergovernmental
competition by well-meaning governments taking
into consideration the productivity differences is
probably the best way to achieve systems of redis-
tribution that are in line with differences in labour
productivity and also to achieve fast convergence
in the growth processes of the different countries.
This is particularly true if adverse migration effects
are minimised by changing the welfare state as was
suggested above. If there is any role for EU level
public decision making, it is in providing opportu-
nities and incentives for fast growth in the poorer
countries.
Nevertheless, there is the difficult question of
whether the EU should purposely redistribute
resources from the richer to the poorer member
countries. Much of the preceding analysis has
viewed the EU primarily as an economic union
with the single market as the main objective.
However, it is sometimes suggested that the EU is
more than a pure economic union even if it is not a
federation, namely one that effectively shifts
resources so as to even out any pre-existing income
differences. Of course, opinions also differ on this
question. In practice, the EU carries out large
redistributive schemes, which suggests that the EU
is something more than a common market.Thus it
is possible to think of giving at least part of the
redistributive task to the EU level.
Looking at current practice, much of the common
agricultural policy appears to be motivated by distri-
butional concerns, although such redistribution can
hardly be defended since rich countries like France
are among the biggest beneficiaries. The various
structural and cohesion funds that are the second
largest item in the EU budget can more easily be
justified by redistributive goals. Their purpose is to
make richer countries pay for the funds flowing to
the poorer countries, and it seems that this purpose
has been achieved. However, the funds should be
more than just income transfers in that they help the
less developed countries to improve their infrastruc-
ture and to support these countries’ own forces of
economic growth. The evidence on whether they
achieved this goal is mixed.Some schemes appear to
have reduced regional disparities (see, for example,
De la Fuente and Vives, 1995 for a study of Spain).
Yet,on balance,it seems that the current EU region-
al policies have not contributed positively to the
catching-up processes of economic growth for the
poorer regions of the EU, as discussed in Boldrin
and Canova (2000). These results suggest that a
reconsideration of the current EU redistributive role
would be worth while.
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